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Abstract. The first decade of election law cases at the Supreme Court under the leadership 
of Chief Justice Roberts brought election law down a strongly conservative path in cases 
involving issues from campaign finance to voting rights to election administration. 
Nonetheless, the Roberts Court, while dominated by a majority of five conservative 
Justices until the recent death of Justice Antonin Scalia, had not gone as far right as it could 
have or as some had predicted.  
This Essay describes the path of election law jurisprudence in the Roberts Court and then 
considers two questions. First, what explains why the Court, while shifting in a strongly 
conservative direction, has not moved more extremely to the right? Second, what options 
has the Court left for election reformers who are unhappy with the strongly conservative, 
although not maximally conservative, status quo? 
On the first question, a combination of factors appears to explain the trajectory and speed 
of the Roberts Court’s election law decisions. The Roberts Court has been fundamentally 
conservative, but for jurisprudential, temperamental, or strategic reasons, Justices who 
have held the balance of power appear to prefer incrementalism to radical change. 
Mandatory appellate jurisdiction appeared the best way to force the Roberts Court’s hand, 
and it often (but not always) led to a conservative result. Nearly half of the Roberts Court’s 
election cases came on mandatory jurisdiction. Finally, the five conservative Justices were 
not monolithic in their views and were capable of surprise. 
On the second question, the Court has left very limited space for reform in certain areas, 
such as campaign finance. Where the Court has greatly constrained choice, only minor 
improvements are possible absent a change in the Supreme Court’s personnel. In these 
areas, the problem is not that reformers have a “romanticized” vision of democracy; it is 
that the structural impediments erected by the Court have hobbled meaningful reform 
efforts. In contrast, in areas in which the Court has mostly left room for decentralized 
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election law approaches, such as in the arena of election administration, election fights are 
becoming both legal and political. Much of the space for reform efforts depends upon the 
future composition of the Court. 
Part I briefly describes the path of election law in the Roberts era across key election law 
areas including campaign finance, voting rights, and election administration. Part II 
explains why the Roberts Court has been deeply conservative but not consistently 
maximalist. Part III considers the space for election reform in the Roberts Court era and 
beyond. 
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Introduction 
The first decade of election law cases at the Supreme Court under the 
leadership of Chief Justice Roberts brought election law down a strong 
conservative path. Citizens United v. FEC11 freed corporate money in U.S. 
candidate elections and opened up a deregulatory era increasingly dominated 
by nominally independent “Super PACs” and other outside groups.2 Shelby 
County v. Holder13 eviscerated the congressional regime codified in section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act, under which Congress required states and localities 
with a history of racial discrimination in voting to obtain federal permission 
before making a change in voting rules by proving that the change would not 
make minority voters worse off. In the case’s wake, previously covered 
jurisdictions have adopted a number of election changes,4 which no doubt have 
made minority voters worse off. In Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 
the Court gave the green light to state voter identification laws,5 despite a lack 
of evidence that such laws are necessary to deter fraud or instill voter 
confidence.6 Republican states have increasingly tightened voting rules in 
Crawford1’s wake.7 
Nonetheless, the Roberts Court, while dominated by a majority of five 
conservative Justices until the recent death of conservative Justice Antonin 
Scalia,8 had not gone as far right as it could have or as I, among others, had 
predicted.9 In the campaign finance arena, the Court refused to take cases to 
strike down the ban on direct corporate contributions to candidates or to 
reopen the ability of political parties to take large “soft money” 
contributions.10 It did not eliminate individual contribution limits, even as 
Super PACs and other campaign groups undermined them.11 In the voting 
 
 1. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 2. See RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME COURT, 
AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 33-34 (2016). 
 3. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 4. See DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN ET AL., ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 63 (5th ed. 
Supp. 2015). 
 5. 553 U.S. 181, 185, 189 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
 6. See id. at 224 (Souter, J., dissenting) (suggesting state concerns about voter fraud “can 
claim modest weight at best”). 
 7. See Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party? 1’: How Courts Should Think About Republican Efforts to 
Make It Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 58 (2014).  
 8. Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 
2016), http://nyti.ms/20vxbrH. 
 9. Richard L. Hasen, No Exit? 1’: The Roberts Court and the Future of Election Law, 57 S.C. L. 
REV. 669, 672 (2006). 
 10. See infra Part I.A.  
 11. Id. 
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rights arena, the Court declined cases that would further limit the scope of, or 
find unconstitutional, section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, a key remaining 
protection for minority voters, and it revived the racial gerrymandering cause 
of action in a way that can help minority plaintiffs fight Republican 
gerrymanders.12 Most recently, the Court surprisingly rejected the 
opportunity to use the Elections Clause to kill independent commission-based 
congressional redistricting and other electoral reforms,13 and it upheld against 
First Amendment challenge a rule barring judicial candidates from personally 
soliciting campaign contributions.14 
In this Essay, I describe the path of election law jurisprudence in the 
Roberts Court and then consider two questions. First, why has the Court, 
while shifting in a strongly conservative direction, not moved more extremely 
to the right?15 Second, what options has the Court left election reformers who 
are unhappy with the strongly conservative, although not maximally 
conservative, status quo?16 
On the first question, a combination of factors appears to explain the 
trajectory and speed of the Roberts Court’s election law decisions. The Roberts 
Court, with its five-Justice bloc of Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices 
Samuel Alito, Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas, was 
fundamentally conservative, but for jurisprudential, temperamental, or 
strategic reasons, the Justices holding the balance of power appeared to prefer 
incrementalism to radical change. Mandatory appellate jurisdiction appeared 
the best way to force the Roberts Court’s hand, and it often, but not always, led 
to a conservative result. Nearly half of the Roberts Court’s election cases came 
on mandatory jurisdiction.17 Progressives meanwhile limited the number of 
cases they presented for the Court’s review to avoid adverse precedent.18 
Finally, the five conservative Justices were not monolithic in their views and 
were capable of surprise, as evidenced by a recent Arizona redistricting 
decision, in which Justice Kennedy joined with the Court’s liberals,19 and a 
recent judicial elections case, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined with the 
Court’s liberals.20 
 
 12. See infra Part I.B. 
 13. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 
(2015). 
 14. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015); see infra Part I.D. 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See infra Appendix. 
 18. Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court’s Shrinking Election Law Docket, 2001-20101’: A Legacy 
of Bush v. Gore or Fear of the Roberts Court?, 10 ELECTION L.J. 325, 326 (2011). 
 19. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).  
 20. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). 
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On the second question, the Court has left very limited space for reform in 
certain areas, such as campaign finance. Where the Court has greatly 
constrained choice, only minor improvements are possible absent a change in 
the Supreme Court’s personnel. In these areas, the problem is not that 
reformers have a “romanticized” vision of democracy; it is that the structural 
impediments erected by the Court have hobbled meaningful reform efforts. In 
contrast, in areas where the Court has mostly left room for decentralized 
election law approaches, such as in the arena of election administration, 
election fights are becoming both legal and political. Polarization and 
decentralization have led to the emergence of “red state election law” and “blue 
state election law,” with voting restrictions increasingly enacted in many 
Republican-leaning states but not Democratic-leaning states or states with 
mixed control. 
Part I briefly describes the path of election law in the Roberts era across 
key election law areas including campaign finance, voting rights, and election 
administration. Part II explains why the Roberts Court was deeply 
conservative but not consistently maximalist. Part III considers the space for 
election reform in the Roberts Court era and beyond. 
I. The Roberts Court’s Election Law Path 
The Supreme Court moved far to the right in key election law areas from 
2005, when Chief Justice Roberts joined,21 and more significantly, from 2006, 
when Justice Samuel Alito replaced former swing Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor,22 until Justice Scalia’s death in 2016. Indeed, the Court’s decisions in 
the campaign finance case of Citizens United123 and the Voting Rights Act case of 
Shelby County124 are among the most prominent and controversial decisions of 
the first decade of the Roberts Court across all areas of law, not just election 
law.25 Nonetheless, the Court during this period notably turned down 
 
 21. Chief Justice Roberts took his judicial oath on September 29, 2005. Members of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, SUP. CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about 
/members_text.aspx (last visited June 6, 2016).  
 22. Justice Alito took his judicial oath on January 31, 2006, and Justice O’Connor’s 
retirement was effective the same day. Id. 
 23. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 24. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 25. See Constitutional Accountability Ctr., Roberts at 10: A Look at the First Decade of 
John Roberts’s Tenure as Chief Justice 5 (2015), http://theusconstitution.org/sites 
/default/files/briefs/Roberts-at-10-A-Look-at-the-First-Decade.pdf (noting Citizens 
United and Shelby County as two examples of how Chief Justice Roberts has “voted to 
move the law to the right”). The Center also provided its own overview of the Roberts 
Court’s first decade in the area of campaign finance and voting rights. See David H. 
Gans, Constitutional Accountability Ctr., Roberts at 10: Campaign Finance and Voting 
footnote continued on next page 
Election Law’s Path in the Roberts Court’s First Decade 
68 STAN. L. REV. 1597 (2016) 
1602 
opportunities to move election law jurisprudence even further to the right, 
and in a few recent cases the Court has reached what most observers consider 
to be more liberal results. 
This Part describes the Roberts Court’s election law jurisprudence through 
the death of Justice Scalia, including the thirty election law cases with a 
written opinion from 2006 to 2015,26 with mention of the three additional 
cases decided in the October 2015 Supreme Court Term.27 
A. Campaign Finance 
Before John Roberts replaced Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Samuel 
Alito replaced Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the Supreme Court went through 
its period of greatest deference to campaign finance regulation, as illustrated by 
four cases I dubbed the “New Deference Quartet.”28 The Court in Shrink 
Missouri upheld extremely low Missouri campaign finance limits,29 
enunciating a standard making it quite easy for courts to reject First 
Amendment challenges to campaign finance laws.30 It upheld limits on 
political party contributions to candidates in Colorado II.31 It rejected a 
challenge to the total ban on corporate contributions to candidates in FEC v. 
Beaumont.32 Perhaps most significantly, the Court in McConnell v. FEC upheld 
the key provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act33 (BCRA or 
McCain-Feingold), including provisions barring corporations and labor unions 
from spending non-PAC treasury funds on “issue ads” in federal elections34 and 
barring political parties from collecting unlimited “soft money.”35 
 
Rights (2015), http://theusconstitution.org/sites/default/files/briefs/Roberts-at-10       
-Easier-to-Donate-Harder-to-Vote.pdf.  
 26. The list of cases appears in the Appendix. The first case listed, Wisconsin Right to Life, 
Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410 (2006) (per curiam), was decided after Chief Justice Roberts 
joined the Court but before Justice Alito replaced Justice O’Connor. 
 27. See Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732 (2016); Harris v. Ariz. Indep. 
Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301 (2016); Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016).  
 28. Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking the Unconstitutionality of Contribution and Expenditure 
Limits in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 891 (2005); see also Richard L. 
Hasen, Buckley Is Dead, Long Live Buckley1’: The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of 
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 42-46 (2004). 
 29. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 382, 384-85 (2000). 
 30. Richard L. Hasen, Shrink Missouri, Campaign Finance, and “The Thing That Wouldn’t 
Leave,” 17 CONST. COMMENT. 483, 484 (2000). 
 31. FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado II1), 533 U.S. 431, 437 (2001).  
 32. 539 U.S. 146, 149 (2003). 
 33. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 28, 36, and 
47 U.S.C.). 
 34. 540 U.S. 93, 190, 194, 206 (2003). 
 35. Id. at 156. 
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The campaign finance landscape changed dramatically with the emergence 
of the Roberts Court, turning a Court that usually voted in favor of campaign 
limits by a 5-4 vote into one usually voting against such limits by a 5-4 vote. 
The move toward deregulation began rather slowly, with the Court first 
punting on an as-applied challenge to McCain-Feingold in Wisconsin Right to 
Life, Inc. v. FEC (WRTL I1)36 and issuing a fractured decision in Randall v. Sorrell, 
striking down Vermont’s very low campaign contribution limits as a First 
Amendment violation.37 Randall has not led to a flood of contribution limits 
being struck down as unconstitutionally low,38 showing the limited reach of 
its decision. 
Things then shifted dramatically. In FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. 
(WRTL II1), Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, wrote a controlling 
opinion that undermined the corporate and union campaign spending limits of 
McCain-Feingold through a strict interpretation of the statute,39 in a move 
Justice Scalia called “faux judicial restraint” because it failed to 
straightforwardly hold the statute unconstitutional.40 Within two years, 
however, the restraint was gone, and the Court in a 5-4 opinion in Citizens 
United simply struck that portion of McCain-Feingold as a First Amendment 
violation.41 In the process, the Court overruled both Austin v. Michigan State 
Chamber of Commerce, a 1990 case that had upheld corporate and labor union 
spending limits dating back to the 1940s,42 and that part of McConnell 
upholding BCRA’s limits on corporate and union “issue advocacy” spending.43 
The Citizens United opinion spawned follow-on lawsuits and FEC 
proceedings,44 which prompted the growth of “Super PACs,” groups nominally 
 
 36. 546 U.S. 410, 412 (2006) (per curiam). 
 37. 548 U.S. 230, 236 (2006) (plurality opinion); id. at 264 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment); id. at 265 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).  
 38. See, e.g., Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 706 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1072, 1074 (S.D. Cal. 
2010) (denying preliminary injunction in a case challenging the city’s $500 individual 
contribution limit). As a matter of disclosure, I was one of the attorneys representing 
the City of San Diego in this challenge. 
 39. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II1), 551 U.S. 449, 469-70 (2007) (plurality 
opinion).  
 40. Id. at 499 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also 
Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence1’: The Roberts Court’s Deregulatory Turn in FEC v. 
Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1064, 1065-66 (2008) (discussing WRTL 
opinions). 
 41. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318-19, 365 (2010). 
 42. 494 U.S. 652, 654-55 (1990); HASEN, supra note 2, at 18. 
 43. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 318-19, 365.  
 44. See, e.g., SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc); Matthew S. 
Petersen, Fed. Election Comm’n, Advisory Opinion 2010-09, at 3 (2010), 
http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/AO%202010-09.pdf; Matthew S. Petersen, Fed. Election 
Comm’n, Advisory Opinion 2010-11, at 3 (2010), http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs 
footnote continued on next page 
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independent of candidates but cooperating to the fullest extent allowed by law 
and perhaps beyond and funded with huge contributions from billionaires and 
others.45 
The Court has done more to deregulate the campaign finance system. In 
Davis v. FEC, it struck down another McCain-Feingold provision that allowed 
candidates running against wealthy individuals who are self-funding to receive 
increased contributions.46 Similarly, in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom 
Club PAC v. Bennett, the Court struck down Arizona’s public financing program 
that provided extra matching funds for candidates running against wealthy 
individuals or large outside spending.47 In both cases, the Court held that the 
law violated the First Amendment because it was motivated by an attempt to 
level the playing field—an interest in political equality the Court rejected in 
both Buckley v. Valeo48 and Citizens United.49 Arizona marked the first time the 
Court applied strict scrutiny to judge a public financing provision in a 
campaign finance law.50 
Most recently, in McCutcheon v. FEC, the Court struck down an aggregate 
(or total) limit on the amount that an individual could contribute to federal 
candidates, parties, and committees in a two-year period.51 In the course of so 
holding, the Court made it easier to bring challenges to other campaign 
contribution limits, with the Chief Justice seeming to lay the groundwork for 
a renewed challenge to McCain-Feingold’s soft money rules.52 
Despite these rulings, which have significantly deregulated the campaign 
finance system, the Court did not go as far as it had been asked to go. In both 
Doe v. Reed and Citizens United, the Court rejected broad challenges to campaign 
disclosure rules.53 A Court majority endorsed disclosure as a more narrowly 
tailored way of dealing with the risk of corruption, as well as a means of 
 
/AO%202010-11.pdf; see also HASEN, supra note 2, at 33-34 (recounting developments 
after Citizens United). 
 45. See HASEN, supra note 2, at 33-34. 
 46. 554 U.S. 724, 729, 744 (2008). 
 47. 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2011). 
 48. 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam). 
 49. 558 U.S. 310, 349-50 (2010) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49). 
 50. See Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2817. The only other Supreme Court case considering 
the constitutionality of a public financing plan was Buckley, in which the Court did not 
apply strict scrutiny. 424 U.S. at 95-96 (per curiam) (testing constitutionality of public 
financing plan against a “sufficiently important government interests” standard). 
 51. 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
 52. See HASEN, supra note 2, at 35-36; see also infra notes 171-76 and accompanying text 
(noting new soft money challenges). 
 53. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 191 (2010) (rejecting, on an 8-1 vote, a facial challenge to a 
Washington law requiring public disclosure of names of persons signing a referendum 
petition); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371 (rejecting, on an 8-1 vote, a challenge to 
various disclosure provisions of BCRA).  
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providing information to voters. Only Justice Thomas and, to some extent, 
Justice Alito have resisted the reliance on disclosure,54 although the Court’s 
liberals see disclosure as a supplement to, not a substitute for, campaign limits. 
The Court twice turned away55 attempts to overrule FEC v. Beaumont, a 
pre-Roberts Court case upholding the federal ban on corporate contributions 
to candidates.56 Challengers had argued with some force that the logic of at 
least the Austin-based rationale used in Beaumont had been undermined by 
Citizens United and other cases.57 The Court also turned away an attempt to 
circumvent McConnell1’s upholding of McCain-Feingold’s soft money ban, with 
three Justices (Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas) voting to hear the case.58 It also 
sidestepped Senator McConnell’s argument in the McCutcheon case to apply 
strict scrutiny to review the constitutionality of campaign contribution 
limits.59 Contribution limits under McCutcheon continue to get lesser “exacting 
scrutiny” review,60 although the Court in McCutcheon redefined such scrutiny 
to be more rigorous than before.61 
 
 54. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 480-85 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (dissenting on disclosure issues); Doe, 561 U.S. at 212 (Alito, J., concurring) (“In this 
case—both through analogy and through their own experiences—plaintiffs have a 
strong case that they are entitled to as-applied relief, and they will be able to pursue 
such relief before the District Court.”).  
 55. See Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014); United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 1459 (2013). 
 56. 539 U.S. 146, 149 (2003). 
 57. See Minn. Concerned Citizens for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 879 n.12 (8th Cir. 
2012) (en banc) (stating that Beaumont1’s “precedential value is on shaky ground”). 
 58. Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 698 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.D.C.), aff1’d, 561 U.S. 1040 (2010). 
The case raised an as-applied challenge to the soft money provisions of BCRA and did 
not ask for the soft money part of McConnell to be formally overruled. Id. at 153. 
Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas stated that they would have noted probable 
jurisdiction and set the case for oral argument. Republican Nat’l Comm., 561 U.S. at 1040; 
see also In re Cao, 619 F.3d 410, 414 (5th Cir. 2010) (rejecting certain challenges to BCRA 
political party limitations), cert. denied sub nom. Cao v. FEC, 131 S. Ct. 1718 (2011). 
 59. Brief of Senator Mitch McConnell as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 4, 
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (No. 12-536), 2013 WL 2102849 (arguing for 
strict scrutiny review of contribution limits).  
 60. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444-46 (declining to consider whether to apply strict scrutiny 
to review of contribution limits). 
 61. See HASEN, supra note 2, at 35-36; Richard L. Hasen, Die Another Day, SLATE (Apr. 2, 
2014, 1:13 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014 
/04/the_subtle_awfulness_of_the_mccutcheon_v_fec_campaign_finance_decision_t
he.html.  
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B. Voting Rights Act 
Without a doubt, the Roberts Court’s most significant voting rights 
opinion is its 2013 decision in Shelby County v. Holder162 striking down the 
Voting Rights Act’s preclearance regime under which Congress required 
jurisdictions with a history of racial discrimination in voting to get federal 
approval before making changes in their voting rules and procedures.63 Before 
Shelby County, the Supreme Court since the 1960s had upheld preclearance 
three times as an appropriate exercise of congressional power given the history 
of racial discrimination in voting in the covered jurisdictions.64 In a 2009 
Roberts Court case, Northwest Austin Municipality Utility District Number One v. 
Holder (NAMUDNO), the Court strongly hinted that the preclearance regime 
was no longer constitutional because the coverage formula contained in 
section 4 of the Act was not based upon evidence of current intentional 
discrimination by covered states.65 Shelby County piggybacked on NAMUDNO 
to strike section 4’s coverage formula as exceeding congressional power, 
rendering section 5 inoperable unless Congress enacted a new (and 
constitutional) coverage formula.66 
Shelby County had an immediate impact on politics in previously covered 
jurisdictions. Texas put into action its very strict voter identification law, 
which had been blocked by both the U.S. Department of Justice and a three-
judge federal court in Washington, D.C. under the preclearance provisions.67 
North Carolina, partially covered by the Act, passed what appears to be the 
largest set of voting restrictions in a single law since the passage of the 1965 
Voting Rights Act.68 Both Texas and North Carolina’s voting changes are 
currently the subject of litigation under the Constitution and section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act.69 
 
 62. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 63. Technically speaking, the Court struck down the section 4 coverage formula, which 
rendered section 5 inoperable unless and until Congress enacts a new (and 
constitutional) coverage formula. For an explanation of why this was a kind of false 
minimalism, see Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 
WM. & MARY BILL RIGHTS J. 713, 713-14 (2014). 
 64. See Lopez v. Monterey Cty., 525 U.S. 266, 282, 284-85 (1999); City of Rome v. United 
States, 446 U.S. 156, 187 (1980); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308, 314 
(1966). 
 65. 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009). 
 66. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631.  
 67. Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 114-15 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated and remanded, 133 
S. Ct. 2886 (2013). 
 68. Hasen, supra note 7, at 60-61. 
 69. See Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 707 (S.D. Tex.) (granting injunction), stayed, 769 
F.3d 890 (5th Cir.), motion to vacate stay denied, 135 S. Ct. 9 (2014); N.C. State Conference 
of the NAACP v. McCrory, No. 1:13cv658, 2016 WL 1650774, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 
2016), appeal filed sub nom. United States v. North Carolina, No. 16-1529 (4th Cir. May 9, 
footnote continued on next page 
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Shelby County was an audacious 5-4 opinion that provoked a strong dissent 
from Justice Ginsburg for the four dissenters,70 but it was not the only case 
limiting the protections of the Voting Rights Act. In Bartlett v. Strickland, the 
Court rejected arguments from voting rights advocates to read section 2 of the 
Act to mandate the drawing of minority voter crossover districts.71 Further, in 
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), the Court appeared to 
change the standards for drawing minority-opportunity districts under section 
2 of the Voting Rights Act.72 Under LULAC, it is not enough for minority 
plaintiffs to show that one can draw a district with enough minority voters so 
that they may elect a representative of their choice; it is also necessary to show 
that minority voters who would be put in a district have enough in common 
on a socioeconomic basis that it makes sense to group these voters together.73 
While this cultural compactness holding helped minority plaintiffs in LULAC 
by reversing a Texas Republican gerrymander, it is not clear that this standard 
will help minority voters generally in section 2 lawsuits. Under this rule, 
jurisdictions cannot be compelled to create minority opportunity districts 
when the minority voters who would be in them have disparate 
socioeconomic backgrounds. 
The Supreme Court also let Texas continue to use its controversial voter 
identification law in the 2014 elections, even though the trial court found that 
the state enacted the law with a racially discriminatory intent and that the law 
caused a racially discriminatory effect in violation of both the Constitution 
and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.74 However, the Court may have been 
reacting more to the timing of the case—with the district court judge changing 
the rules just before the 2014 early voting period was about to start and after 
 
2016); Richard L. Hasen, The Voting Wars Heat Up, SLATE (Sept. 29, 2014, 10:30 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/09/voting_res
trictions_may_reach_the_supreme_court_from_ohio_wisconsin_north.html; see also 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department to File Lawsuit Against the 
State of North Carolina to Stop Discriminatory Changes to Voting Law (Sept. 30, 
2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-file-lawsuit-against-state     
-north-carolina-stop-discriminatory-changes; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Justice Department to File New Lawsuit Against State of Texas over Voter I.D. Law 
(Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-file-new-lawsuit    
-against-state-texas-over-voter-id-law.  
 70. See 133 S. Ct. at 2632-52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 71. 556 U.S. 1, 23 (2009) (plurality opinion). 
 72. 548 U.S. 399, 441-42 (2006) (holding that Texas could not maintain compliance with 
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act after breaking up a Latino opportunity district “by 
creating an entirely new district that combined two groups of Latinos, hundreds of 
miles apart, that represent different communities of interest”). 
 73. See id. at 424-25, 432-34, 441-42. 
 74. Veasey, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 702-03. 
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Texas had already implemented its voter identification law in elections—than 
to the merits of the case.75 
As in the campaign finance area, the Roberts Court’s voting rights 
decisions show a sharp turn to the right, but its decisions could have been more 
extreme. The Court refused to entertain arguments that section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act was unconstitutional, preferring instead to adopt narrower 
interpretations of the Act that avoided the constitutional questions.76 It denied 
certiorari in a case challenging the creation of majority-minority districts 
under the California Voting Rights Act, a challenge that, if successful, could 
have called into question the constitutionality of section 2.77 The Court also 
declined to hear a section 2 challenge to Wisconsin’s voter identification law, 
despite the fact that the court of appeals divided 5-5 on the key issues in the 
case and the influential Judge Richard Posner wrote an impassioned dissent 
from the refusal of the Seventh Circuit to rehear an emergency appeal in the 
case.78 Given the Supreme Court’s conservative orientation, if it had heard the 
case it could very well have affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s holding that 
Wisconsin’s restrictive voter identification law did not violate section 2 and 
extended a narrow reading of section 2 nationwide. 
Further, in last Term’s Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama case, 
Justice Kennedy joined with the four liberal Justices on the Court in allowing 
minority plaintiffs to raise a “racial gerrymandering” claim to defeat a 
Republican attempt to pack black Democrats into fewer districts.79 The cause 
of action before the Supreme Court was not one for vote dilution. Instead, it 
 
 75. For an analysis of the Court’s decision to allow the voter ID law to remain in place and 
of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, see Richard L. Hasen, Reining in the Purcell Principle, FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=2545676. 
 76. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One (NAMUDNO) v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 197 
(2009) (engaging in a contorted act of statutory interpretation to avoid the question of 
the Voting Rights Act’s constitutionality); Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 21 (plurality opinion) 
(adopting a narrow interpretation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to avoid 
serious constitutional question with scope of statute); LULAC, 548 U.S. at 445-46 
(plurality opinion) (same). Bartlett was a plurality opinion rather than a majority 
opinion because Justices Scalia and Thomas took the position that section 2 does not 
allow any vote dilution claims. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 26 (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment); see also LULAC, 548 U.S. at 512 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part) (rejecting, joined by Justice Thomas, application of section 2 to 
vote dilution claims).  
 77. Sanchez v. City of Modesto, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 821, 825-26 (Ct. App. 2006), cert. denied, 552 
U.S. 974 (2007). 
 78. Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 863, 879 (E.D. Wis.) (holding that Wisconsin’s 
voter identification law violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the U.S. 
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause and enjoining the law’s use in elections), rev’d, 
768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied by an equally divided court, 773 F.3d 783 (7th 
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015); see also Frank, 773 F.3d at 783 (Posner, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 79. 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1274 (2015). 
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was a racial gerrymandering claim alleging an unconstitutional use of race as 
the “predominant” factor in redistricting.80 This claim had been used in the 
1990s to attack the creation of minority opportunity districts but was now 
being used by Democrats and minority plaintiffs.81 The case should moderately 
improve the chances for challenging some Republican gerrymanders.82 
C.  Election Administration 
The Roberts Court issued two opinions related to voter identification 
laws: Purcell v. Gonzalez183 and Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.84 In 
Purcell, the Court allowed Arizona to use its new voter identification law while 
a case against its legality was pending in federal district court.85 The Court 
reversed a Ninth Circuit stay in a short and somewhat inscrutable per curiam 
opinion that has come to stand for the principle that courts should not impose 
emergency orders in the period just before an election.86 In the course of 
discussion, however, the Court indicated (without providing empirical 
support) that voter identification laws can promote public confidence and 
ensure that turnout will not decline due to fears of illegal votes diluting legal 
ones.87 
The Court took a deeper look at voter identification laws in the 2008 
Crawford case challenging Indiana’s new law, which at the time was one of the 
strictest in the nation. On a 6-3 vote, the Court rejected a facial challenge to the 
law, finding that most voters would not be burdened by the requirement and 
that the potential for preventing voter fraud and promoting public confidence 
was enough of a reason to justify the requirement,88 even absent proof of a 
major problem with impersonation fraud. The six Justices in the majority 
divided into distinct groups, however. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Stevens and Kennedy left the door open for as-applied challenges as to those 
 
 80. Id. at 1262. 
 81. See Richard L. Hasen, Racial Gerrymandering’s Questionable Revival, 67 ALA. L. REV. 365, 
365-66, 367-78 (2015) (describing evolution of racial gerrymandering cause of action). 
 82. For a critical look, see id. at 384. 
 83. 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam). 
 84. 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
 85. 549 U.S. at 5-6 (per curiam). 
 86. See id. at 3, 5. 
 87. Id. at 4. For more on the timing question, see Hasen, supra note 75 (manuscript at 14-
18). For a critique of the Purcell analysis, see Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of 
Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (2007). See also Stephen Ansolabehere & 
Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder1’: The Role of Public Opinion in the 
Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1750-51 (2008) 
(finding that voter confidence in the electoral process is not correlated with the 
presence or absence of a voter identification law in the state). 
 88. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191, 197, 200-02 (plurality opinion). 
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voters facing serious impediments in securing a form of voter identification 
the state accepted as adequate,89 while Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas 
believed the law was valid as applied to all voters in the state, even against 
those for whom the law would be a major burden.90 
In the wake of the Crawford ruling, an increasing number of states—all 
with Republican-dominated legislatures—enacted new voter identification 
laws even stricter than the one upheld in Crawford.91 With the constitutional 
claims mostly foreclosed by Crawford, challengers raised new arguments under 
state constitutions and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Both sets of 
arguments initially had some success, and the section 2 claims have been 
litigated in a few cases.92 As noted in Part I.B, the Court passed over its first 
opportunity, out of Wisconsin, to consider the scope of section 2 in this 
context.93 Earlier, however, the Court put the Wisconsin law on hold for the 
2014 election, given strong arguments that there was not enough time for 
Wisconsin officials to put the new identification requirement into effect 
without disenfranchising many Wisconsin voters. It was the mirror image of 
the situation in Texas, where the Court let the voter identification law already 
in place stay in place.94 
The Court also mostly punted on other significant election law 
administration cases that came before it. In 2008, it rejected a challenge by the 
Ohio Republican Party to the Ohio Secretary of State’s refusal to match voter 
registration information with the state’s motor vehicle database.95 The Ohio 
Republican Party argued that the requirement was set forth by the Help 
America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA),96 but the Court in a per curiam opinion 
determined that the party likely did not have standing to raise a HAVA 
violation claim.97 
 
 89. Id. at 202-03. 
 90. Id. at 204 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Justin Levitt contrasts the two 
approaches as the difference between an on/off light switch and a dimmer switch. 
Justin Levitt, Crawford—More Rhetorical Bark than Legal Bite?, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 
(May 2, 2008), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/archives/crawford_more 
_rhetorical_bark_than_legal_bite.  
 91. See Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the Resurrection of 
Bush v. Gore, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1865, 1872 (2013). 
 92. For a look at how courts have decided, and should decide, such challenges, see Daniel P. 
Tokaji, Applying Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 439, 473-89 
(2015). See generally Hasen, supra note 91 (describing election administration litigation 
in the 2012 election cycle). 
 93. See supra Part I.B. 
 94. See supra notes 74, 78 and accompanying text. 
 95. Brunner v. Ohio Republican Party, 555 U.S. 5, 5-6 (2008) (per curiam). 
 96. Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-545 
(2014)). 
 97. Brunner, 555 U.S. at 5-6 (per curiam). 
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The Court refused to intervene in a 2012 election case from Ohio in which 
a federal district court and the Sixth Circuit reversed Ohio’s modest cutback in 
early voting.98 These lower courts had adopted a very pro-plaintiff reading of 
the Equal Protection Clause and one that the Court would have been unlikely 
to adopt should it have reached the issue.99 In the 2014 election, the lower 
courts again stopped a legislative rollback of Ohio’s early voting schedule, but 
this time the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and allowed Ohio’s 
rollback without comment.100 
D. Other Cases 
Although campaign finance, voting rights, and election administration 
disputes made up the bulk of the Roberts Court’s election law cases, the Court 
also decided other cases on issues including judicial elections, political party 
primaries, and redistricting. 
Two of the most notable election law cases in the “other” category both 
involved judicial elections, and both reached results in which four 
conservative Justices dissented. In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Justice 
Kennedy wrote an opinion joined by the four liberals in holding that under the 
Due Process Clause, a West Virginia Supreme Court justice had to recuse 
himself from considering a case involving a person who had contributed $3 
million to an independent group supporting that justice’s election to office.101 
The opinion’s understanding of the role independent spending can play in 
elections and at least the appearance of undue influence over the elected official 
who benefited from the spending was in considerable tension with the role of 
money Justice Kennedy later described in Citizens United. In Citizens United, the 
Court rejected the idea that the use of campaign money independent of 
candidates could be limited to prevent anyone from having disproportionate 
influence, while in Caperton, the Court held that the large contributions to an 
 
 98. Obama for Am. v. Husted, 888 F. Supp. 2d 897, 899 (S.D. Ohio), aff1’ d, 697 F.3d 423 (6th 
Cir.), stay denied, 133 S. Ct. 497 (2012). 
 99. See Hasen, supra note 91, at 1880-87 (describing litigation and critiquing lower court 
jurisprudential theories); Adam Liptak, Justices Clear the Way for Early Voting in Ohio, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2012), http://nyti.ms/R300eX. 
100. Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808, 852-53 (S.D. Ohio) 
(granting preliminary injunction), aff1’ d, 768 F.3d 524 (6th Cir.), stay granted, 135 S. Ct. 
42 (2014). The case then settled, but new plaintiffs have filed suit challenging the 
rollback and other election law changes. Darrel Rowland, Federal Lawsuit Filed Against 
Ohio’s Voting System, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (May 11, 2015, 7:30 PM), 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2015/05/11/0511-hillary-lawsuit 
.html.  
101. 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009). 
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independent group benefitting a justice created disproportionate influence 
over the justice and merited recusal.102 
In Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, Chief Justice Roberts wrote an opinion 
joined by the four liberals that rejected a First Amendment challenge to a 
Florida judicial canon barring judicial candidates from personally soliciting 
campaign contributions.103 Although the Court applied strict scrutiny to the 
provision, it held that the law survived. Chief Justice Roberts notably 
explained that “narrow[] tailor[ing]” did not require “perfect[] tailor[ing],” even 
under strict scrutiny.104 This opinion, too, was in considerable tension with 
the Court’s approach to campaign restrictions in Citizens United as well as with 
a pre-Roberts case, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, which seemed to 
reject special speech rules for judicial elections as inconsistent with the First 
Amendment.105 In Caperton, Chief Justice Roberts wrote a bitter dissent;106 in 
Williams-Yulee, Justice Kennedy wrote a strong dissent.107 The rest of the 
Justices were consistent. The four liberals voted with the majority in both 
cases, and the three remaining conservatives dissented. 
The Roberts Court decided another case involving judicial elections, New 
York State Board of Elections v. Lopez Torres, rejecting a challenge to New York’s 
byzantine system for nominating judicial candidates in partisan primaries.108 A 
successful challenge could have made those elections more competitive, but the 
Court rejected the idea that voters possess a right to competitive elections.109 
 
102. For a critique and comparison of the two cases, see Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United 
and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 611-15 (2011). 
103. 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1672 (2015). 
104. Id. at 1671 (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 209 (1992) (plurality opinion)). 
105. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002). 
106. See 556 U.S. at 890 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
107. See 135 S. Ct. at 1682 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
108. 552 U.S. 196, 209 (2008). 
109. Consider the Court’s statement in Lopez Torres1: 
The reason one-party rule is entrenched may be (and usually is) that voters approve of the 
positions and candidates that the party regularly puts forward. It is no function of the First 
Amendment to require revision of those positions or candidates. The States can, within limits 
(that is, short of violating the parties’ freedom of association), discourage party monopoly—for 
example, by refusing to show party endorsement on the election ballot. But the Constitution 
provides no authority for federal courts to prescribe such a course. The First Amendment 
creates an open marketplace where ideas, most especially political ideas, may compete without 
government interference. It does not call on the federal courts to manage the market by 
preventing too many buyers from settling upon a single product. 
Id. at 208 (citation omitted). This statement is fairly seen as a rejection of the “politics as 
markets” approach of Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes, which calls upon courts 
to decide election law cases by promoting political competition. See Samuel Issacharoff 
& Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets1’: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 643, 648 (1998). For some critiques of the structural approach, see 
RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM 
BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 138-56 (2003); Bruce E. Cain, Garrett’s Temptation, 85 VA. 
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In Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, the Court 
allowed the state of Washington to use a top-two primary, which included 
information on the party preference of candidates on the ballot, so long as no 
evidence suggested that voters were confused by the ballot into thinking they 
were actually participating in a partisan primary.110 It was a significant 
cutback on the pre-Roberts case of California Democratic Party v. Jones.111 In 
Jones, the Court struck down a similar form of “blanket primary” as violating 
the First Amendment associational rights of the parties.112 Washington State 
Grange blessed a method that Washington State had used to achieve much of 
what the “blanket primary” was meant to accomplish but without running into 
the constitutional problems the Court identified in Jones. 
In Tennant v. Jefferson County Commission, the Court loosened the strict 
mathematical equality it had required states to use to draw congressional 
districts.113 And, in a case decided after the ten-year period of this study, 
Evenwel v. Abbott, the Court unanimously rejected an argument that the 
Constitution required drawing districts with total voters rather than total 
population.114 In Evenwel, the Court may have pulled back on Tennant, with the 
Court stating: “States must draw congressional districts with populations as 
close to perfect equality as possible.”115 
As we will see,116 Evenwel was a case heard initially by a three-judge district 
court, with direct appeal to the Supreme Court. In Shapiro v. McManus, the 
Court clarified the standards for determining when a federal district court 
must convene a three-judge court to hear a redistricting challenge.117 
Finally, in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission, Justice Kennedy joined with the Court’s four liberals to reject a 
challenge to congressional redistricting conducted with an independent 
 
L. REV. 1589, 1600-03 (1999); Richard L. Hasen, The “Political Market” Metaphor and 
Election Law1’: A Comment on Issacharoff and Pildes, 50 STAN. L. REV. 719, 724-28 (1998); 
and Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Supreme Court Has No Theory of Politics—And Be 
Thankful for Small Favors, in THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 
283, 296-301 (David K. Ryden ed., 2d ed. 2002). See generally Nathaniel Persily, In Defense 
of Foxes Guarding Henhouses1’: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting 
Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649 (2002) (expressing skepticism of court 
intervention to promote political competition in redistricting). 
110. 552 U.S. 442, 444, 458-59 (2008). 
111. 530 U.S. 567 (2000). 
112. Id. at 577. 
113. 133 S. Ct. 3, 7-8 (2012) (per curiam). 
114. 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1123 (2016). 
115. Id. at 1124. 
116. See infra Part II (discussing the role of mandatory appellate jurisdiction in Supreme 
Court election law docket formation). 
117. 136 S. Ct. 450, 454-55 (2015) (holding that statutorily appropriate claims must be heard 
by a three-judge court unless frivolous). 
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commission pursuant to a voter initiative taking that power away from the 
state legislature.118 The Arizona legislature argued that the Elections Clause 
vests only in state legislatures (subject to congressional override) the power to 
redistrict.119 The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Ginsburg (over a 
strenuous dissent by Chief Justice Roberts120), read the term “Legislature” in 
the Elections Clause more broadly to include the lawmaking process of a 
state.121 Had the Court sided with the dissenters, it would have doomed not 
only independent redistricting commissions conducting legislative 
redistricting, but also initiatives and state constitutional amendments 
concerning election rules that bypassed the state legislature to become 
effective. 
II. Explaining the Conservative, but Not Maximalist, Turn 
In 2006, at the start of the Roberts Court era, I surveyed the state of 
election law and made predictions about what the shift from Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor to Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito 
would likely mean to the Court across key areas of election law. I 
prognosticated as follows: 
Making predictions is always dangerous, and the conclusions I reach should 
be taken in the tentative spirit in which they are made. My best guess is that a 
decade from now, we may well face a set of election law rules that differ a great 
deal from today’s rules. It may be that in 2016, individuals, corporations, and 
unions will be free to give as much money as they want to any candidate or 
group, subject to the filing of disclosure reports. The federal government’s ability 
to protect the voting rights of minority groups that historically have been the 
victims of state discrimination may be curtailed by the inability of Congress to 
require any jurisdictions to submit their voting changes for preclearance and by 
an emasculated reading of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The ability of states 
to manipulate election rules for partisan gain may present the greatest danger as 
the Court exits from that corner of the political thicket. For those who look to 
courts for the promotion of political equality, the signs are not encouraging.122 
In retrospect, I was mostly on the mark, although things did not turn out 
quite as badly (from my perspective) as I predicted. While individuals, labor 
unions, and corporations are now free to give as much money as they want to 
independent groups, they are still limited in how much they can give directly 
to candidates and political parties.123 While the Court indeed gutted the 
 
118. 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658, 2668 (2015). 
119. Id. at 2659. 
120. See id. at 2677 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
121. Id. at 2668 (majority opinion). 
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preclearance regime of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and has read section 
2 of the Act narrowly, it has not so eviscerated section 2 as to render it useless 
in redistricting cases.124 Indeed, section 2 still requires that states and localities 
maintain minority opportunity districts under some conditions.125 And while 
the Court has allowed partisan manipulation of election rules, such as the 
imposition of voter identification provisions for partisan gain,126 it has not 
completely left the arena. In the area of partisan gerrymandering, for example, 
the Court (thanks to Justice Kennedy) continues to hold out hope for coming 
up with a manageable standard for judging the impermissible consideration of 
partisanship.127 In the meantime, the Arizona redistricting case frees up states 
to try redistricting commissions or other measures such as state constitutional 
amendment to try to rein in the greatest partisan excesses.128  
What explains why the conservative Roberts Court up until Justice 
Scalia’s death issued some terrible opinions from the progressive perspective, 
including Citizens United, McCutcheon, Shelby County, and Crawford, but did not 
go even further by killing contribution limits to candidates, holding 
unconstitutional or killing through chary interpretation section 2 of the 
 
124. See supra Part I.B. 
125. League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 425-26 (2006) 
(setting forth standards). 
126. See supra Part I.C. 
127. As the Court noted just this last Term in the Arizona redistricting case: 
This case concerns an endeavor by Arizona voters to address the problem of partisan 
gerrymandering—the drawing of legislative district lines to subordinate adherents of one 
political party and entrench a rival party in power. “[P]artisan gerrymanders,” this Court has 
recognized, “[are incompatible] with democratic principles.”  
Even so, the Court in Vieth did not grant relief on the plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymander 
claim. The plurality held the matter nonjusticiable. Justice KENNEDY found no standard 
workable in that case, but left open the possibility that a suitable standard might be identified 
in later litigation.  
Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015) 
(alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 
(2004) (plurality opinion)). 
128. The Florida Supreme Court, relying on Arizona, recently rejected an Elections Clause 
challenge to a voter initiative as applied to congressional districts requiring the Florida 
legislature to avoid intentional partisan manipulation in drawing legislative districts. 
League of Women Voters v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363, 370 n.2 (Fla. 2015) (“We reject the 
Legislature’s federal constitutional challenge to the Fair Districts Amendment. The 
Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Arizona confirms that neither the ‘Elections Clause’ 
of the United States Constitution nor federal law prohibits the people of a state, 
through the citizen initiative process, from directing the way in which its 
congressional district boundaries are drawn. As the Supreme Court explained, 
‘[b]anning lawmaking by initiative to direct a State’s method of apportioning 
congressional districts’ would ‘stymie attempts to curb partisan gerrymandering, by 
which the majority in the legislature draws district lines to their party’s advantage.’” 
(alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 
2676)). 
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Voting Rights Act, and more? And why did it carve out special rules allowing 
for some regulation of judicial elections and reserve some space for continued 
policing (or at least exploration of means to police) partisan gerrymandering 
claims? There appears to be no single answer for the speed bumps and twists in 
the Court’s sharp right turn, but based on the limited information we have—
with no access to Court correspondence or to the Justices’ private thoughts—
three factors appear as likely explanations. 
A. The Long Game?  
A Justice plays the “long game” by not moving the law in his or her 
preferred direction immediately, but acting strategically to put his or her 
preferences into the law over a series of cases and years. The long game may 
help preserve the legitimacy of the Court by purporting to show the Court 
moving slowly, minimally, and in line with gradual changes in precedent. 
Before the Court decided Citizens United, Chief Justice Roberts wrote a 
controlling opinion, joined by Justice Alito, in WRTL II that seriously 
undermined the McCain-Feingold campaign finance law without actually 
ruling the law unconstitutional.129 It was this opinion, which avoided a 
straight-out declaration of unconstitutionality, that prompted Justice Scalia’s 
“faux judicial restraint is judicial obfuscation” comment.130 Even in the 
drafting of Citizens United, the Court did not immediately overrule Austin and 
the relevant portion of McConnell, which upheld corporate and labor union 
spending limits.131 Instead, at the end of the October 2009 Term, after briefing 
and oral argument, the Court ordered a new round of briefing and argument 
on the overruling question the following September.132 
Before the Court on a 5-4 vote struck down the coverage formula for the 
preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act in Shelby County,133 it issued an 
8-1 decision in NAMUDNO raising deep constitutional doubts about whether 
Congress exceeded its powers in extending preclearance.134 
Such actions signal that at least some of the Justices are not in a rush to 
overrule past precedent or at least do not want to appear to be in a rush. The 
reasons for waiting may be jurisprudential, temperamental, or strategic. 
WRTL II and NAMUDNO represent at least the appearance of judicial 
minimalism, of trying to decide less, and of giving political actors a chance to 
 
129. 551 U.S. 449, 478-79 (2007) (plurality opinion) (adopting a very broad test for 
exempting corporate campaign spending from McCain-Feingold spending 
limitations). 
130. Id. at 499 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
131. See HASEN, supra note 2, at 110. 
132. See id. at 107-13 (reviewing history of Citizens United arguments and decision). 
133. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). 
134. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202-03 (2009). 
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respond.135 Whether the Chief Justice crafted these rulings out of a genuine 
desire to decide less or to preserve the Court’s legitimacy is difficult to say. We 
do know from some leaked deliberations surrounding Citizens United that the 
Court initially was prepared to overturn Austin and part of McConnell without 
that issue being fully briefed, and Justice Souter wrote a draft dissent blasting 
the Justices for deciding the issue without briefing.136 The Court then ordered 
additional briefing and reached the same result.137 With Justice Souter retiring 
in the interim, Justice Stevens incorporated much of Justice Souter’s draft 
dissent into his own—so much so that Stevens initially had a footnote in his 
dissent thanking Souter for his contributions to the dissent (a footnote that 
apparently his colleagues persuaded him to remove).138 Was the additional 
briefing just window dressing, or did one or more of the Justices in the Citizens 
United majority believe the briefing actually was necessary to decide the issue? 
The window dressing idea is consistent with the long game, as it maintains the 
legitimacy of the Court while moving the law in the Justices’ preferred 
direction. 
Despite the (eventual) aggressiveness in Citizens United and then in 
McCutcheon, the Court has passed on some other opportunities to strike 
remaining campaign finance limits. It could have granted certiorari in the 
Republican National Committee’s (RNC) renewed challenge to the soft money 
rules, but Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas could not get a fourth vote 
from Roberts or Alito.139 Perhaps Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito were 
reluctant because the case was framed as an as-applied challenge rather than a 
straightforward call to overturn the soft money portion of McConnell; perhaps 
not.140 The Court’s refusal twice to consider overturning the Beaumont case 
upholding a bar on corporate contributions to candidates and its refusal to 
adopt strict scrutiny for review of campaign contribution limits in McCutcheon 
suggest a slower approach.141 But outward aggressiveness may be unnecessary. 
The Court has already caused the existing campaign finance system to slowly 
implode. Ultimately we may well get to a deregulated system, but we are 
 
135. For an exploration of the possible motives, see Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional 
Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181, 195-222. 
136. See HASEN, supra note 2, at 110. 
137. Id. 
138. MARCIA COYLE, THE ROBERTS COURT: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION 272 
(2013); see also Adam Liptak, Justice Stevens Suggests Solution for ‘Giant Step in the Wrong 
Direction,’ N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1lttKOP; Jeffrey Toobin, Money 
Unlimited1’: How Chief Justice John Roberts Orchestrated the Citizens United Decision, NEW 
YORKER (May 21, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/05/21/money    
-unlimited. 
139. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
140. See supra note 58 (describing as-applied challenge in an earlier soft money case). 
141. See supra Part I.A. 
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watching things move more slowly than if the Court acted more directly, and 
in a way in which the Court’s fingerprints are not fully on the evidence. 
Elsewhere I have suggested that Chief Justice Roberts has been willing to 
play the long game,142 seeing no need to rush in moving the law in his 
preferred direction so as to preserve the Court’s political capital and 
legitimacy. Justice Alito has played this game too, inviting litigants to file 
briefs raising issues, signaling an overruling, and queuing up issues for a future 
case.143 The calculation may turn out to be incorrect with a potential shift in 
the balance of power on the Court should a Democratic president appoint a 
replacement for Justice Scalia, and it might be that the Court soon will be 
poised to move in a liberal direction. These Justices who seemed to have all the 
time in the world now have seen their time run out, or at least put on hold 
until there are other personnel changes on the Court.144 
B. Mandatory Appellate Jurisdiction and Strategic Litigation Choices.  
If the majority of the Court does lean conservatively on election law issues 
but at least a few Justices see a benefit in moving slowly, then the speed and 
direction of the Court’s election law precedent may depend on which cases get 
to the Court and how they get there. Savvy players know this, and liberal and 
conservative litigants adopted different strategies when the Court had a five-
Justice conservative majority. 
As I demonstrated in an earlier article, liberal litigants during the Roberts 
Court era mostly tried to keep election law cases out of the Supreme Court, out 
of fear that the Court would be likely to make things worse.145 The few times 
liberals pursued a different strategy, it backfired. Consider Randall v. Sorrell, 
where the successful campaign finance reformers defending Vermont’s 
campaign finance law in the Second Circuit supported Supreme Court 
review.146 Those reformers hoped that the Court would use the case to 
overrule that portion of Buckley v. Valeo147 holding that campaign spending 
limits violate the First Amendment.148 The Court in Randall not only rejected 
 
142. Richard L. Hasen, Opinion, The Chief Justice’s Long Game, N.Y. TIMES (1’June 26, 2013), 
http://nyti.ms/12iDzI3.  
143. See Richard L. Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings, Invitations, Time Bombs, and Inadvertence1’: 
How Supreme Court Justices Move the Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 779, 796 (2012). 
144. Richard L. Hasen, Opinion, Why the Most Urgent Civil Rights Cause of Our Time Is the 
Supreme Court Itself, TPM (Sept. 28, 2015, 6:00 AM EDT), http://talkingpointsmemo 
.com/cafe/supreme-court-greatest-civil-rights-cause.  
145. Hasen, supra note 18, at 330-32. 
146. 548 U.S. 230, 239-40 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
147. 424 U.S. 1, 57-59 (1976) (per curiam); see also Randall, 548 U.S. at 242-43 (plurality 
opinion). 
148. Rick Hasen, Supreme Court Election Law Preview, ELECTION L. BLOG (Sept. 26, 2005, 1:50 
PM), http://electionlawblog.org/archives/004068.html (“You can find six amicus briefs 
footnote continued on next page 
Election Law’s Path in the Roberts Court’s First Decade 
68 STAN. L. REV. 1597 (2016) 
1619 
the challenge to Buckley’s holding on spending limits;149 it recognized a 
contribution limitation as unconstitutionally low for the first time.150 
Similarly, in Crawford,151 opponents of state voter identification laws 
(including me152) urged the Supreme Court to take the case to overturn a 
Seventh Circuit opinion by Judge Posner belittling the voting rights claims of 
the challengers.153 The Court took the case and gave a national green light to 
voter identification laws, taking a bad Seventh Circuit precedent and making it 
national.154 A few years later, Judge Posner changed his mind about these 
laws155 and wrote a dissent from the Seventh Circuit’s decision not to consider 
en banc a panel decision to uphold Wisconsin’s voter identification law.156 
Indeed, it was quite controversial when the challengers to Wisconsin’s law 
sought Supreme Court review in 2014. The Court denied review, much to the 
relief of many on the progressive side who feared the Court could nationalize 
bad Seventh Circuit precedent on the scope of section 2 vote denial claims.157 
Some voting rights supporters are hoping for the Supreme Court to 
eventually rule against Texas’s strict voter identification law, where a lower 
 
supporting the winning side of the Second Circuit Sorrell case here. Usually, of course, 
the side that wins in the Court of Appeals opposes a grant of cert. But for years it has 
been the mission of some . . . such as NVRI . . . to try to get the Supreme Court to 
reconsider that aspect of Buckley v. Valeo striking down spending limits as violating 
the First Amendment rights of speech and association. Here’s a chance, the argument 
must be, to push the issue, by noting the circuit split, and lining up some heavy hitters 
(current and former Senators, state Secretaries of State, state judges, and attorneys 
general) on the winning side to support review to revisit this issue in a high profile 
case. On reflection, I think this strategy could well backfire.”).  
149. Randall, 548 U.S. at 244 (plurality opinion) (refusing to overrule Buckley1’s holding on 
spending limits). 
150. See id. at 262.  
151. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
152. Richard L. Hasen, A Voting Test for the High Court, WASH. POST (Sept. 19,                    
2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/18 
/AR2007091801572.html.  
153. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 950, 952, 954 (7th Cir. 2007). 
154. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 204. 
155. John Schwartz, Judge in Landmark Case Disavows Support for Voter ID, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
15, 2013), http://www.nyti.ms/18jSPaK. He has since moved away from that claim, 
saying only that he is sure he “may” have been wrong. Richard A. Posner, I Did Not 
‘Recant’ on Voter ID Laws, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 27, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com 
/article/115363/richard-posner-i-did-not-recant-my-opinion-voter-id. 
156. Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 783 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc). 
157. Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 862-63, 879 (E.D. Wis. 2014) (holding that 
Wisconsin’s voter identification law violated Voting Rights Act section 2 and the U.S. 
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, and enjoining law’s use in elections), rev’d, 768 
F.3d 744 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied by an equally divided court, 773 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 
2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015). 
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court made a finding of intentional racial discrimination in passing the law.158 
But this is risky business, which ultimately depends on whether liberals or 
conservatives control the Court at the time the Court would hear such a case. 
Consider the decision of the U.S. Solicitor General not to seek review of the 
D.C. Circuit’s SpeechNow case, which opened up the era of Super PACs by 
striking down the limits on contributions to political action committees that 
do not contribute directly to candidates.159 The calculation may have been that 
the Supreme Court would only have made things worse. 
While liberals were mostly trying to keep cases out of the Roberts Court, 
conservatives were trying to get them into the Court.160 They have a great tool 
to do so in certain cases: mandatory appellate jurisdiction. Most cases get to the 
Supreme Court on a discretionary petition for writ of certiorari. Denial of 
certiorari has no precedential value, meaning that litigants cannot rely upon 
the Court’s decision not to hear the case as an indication that the lower court 
got it right.161 However, by virtue of federal statutes, certain voting rights, 
redistricting, and campaign finance cases come to the Supreme Court directly 
on appeal from a three-judge federal district court.162 
When the Court considers an appeal, it can summarily affirm or dismiss, 
summarily reverse, or note probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument. 
 
158. Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487, 493 (5th Cir. 2015). The Fifth Circuit will rehear the 
case en banc. Veasey v. Abbott, 815 F.3d 958 (5th Cir. 2016) (mem.). 
159. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 689, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc); Lyle 
Denniston, No Appeal in SpeechNow, SCOTUSBLOG (1’June 17, 2010, 11:55 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/06/no-appeal-in-speechnow (“The government’s 
top lawyer in Supreme Court cases decided Thursday not to ask the Justices to revive a 
federal law that restricted the amount of money that independent political advocacy 
groups can raise for their efforts to influence the election of members of Congress and 
the presidency. . . . Katyal’s decision was unexpected, since the Justice Department 
rarely declines to come to the defense of the constitutionality of a federal law that has 
been nullified by a lower court. Even so, the prospect of persuading the Supreme Court 
to overturn the Circuit Court ruling was not a bright one. The Circuit Court had said 
that the result was virtually dictated by the Supreme Court’s controversial ruling last 
January, in Citizens United v. FEC.”). 
160. See generally Hasen, supra note 18 (describing liberal and conservative attempts to get 
the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts to consider election law cases). 
The great irony here is that the three-judge court in voting rights cases long served as 
a weapon of liberals to keep cases out of the hands of single conservative judges 
opposed to a strong reading of the Voting Rights Act. See Michael E. Solimine, 
Congress, Ex Parte Young, and the Fate of the Three-Judge District Court, 70 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 101, 126-29 (2008). 
161. For discussions of issues related to mandatory appellate jurisdiction and election law, 
see Joshua A. Douglas, The Procedure of Election Law in Federal Courts, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 
433, 433-35; Hasen, supra note 18, at 328 n.12; and Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge 
District Court in Voting Rights Litigation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 81-82, 132-33 
(1996). 
162. See Douglas, supra note 161, at 456 (describing federal statutes establishing special 
appellate procedures in certain election law cases). 
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A decision to affirm or dismiss is precedential, and it means that the lower 
courts got the result right (although perhaps not the reasoning). For this 
reason, the Justices appear much more reluctant to let things slide in a case on 
appeal than on a petition for certiorari; they feel much more of an obligation to 
hear the case. 
Consider this exchange between Chief Justice Roberts and lawyer (and 
former Solicitor General) Ted Olson in the first Citizens United oral argument: 
MR. OLSON: 
. . . I said at the beginning that this is an incomprehensible prohibition, 
and . . . I think that’s demonstrated by the fact that since 2003 this Court has issued 
something close to 500 pages of opinions interpreting and trying to apply the 
First Amendment to Federal election law. And I counted 22 separate opinions 
from the Justices of this Court attempting to—in just the last 6 years, attempting 
to figure out what this statute means, how it can be interpreted. In fact— 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, that’s because it’s mandatory appellate 
jurisdiction. I mean, you don’t have a choice. 
(Laughter.)163 
Of the thirty election law cases from 2006 to 2015 in which the Roberts 
Court issued an opinion, fourteen of them came to the Court on mandatory 
appellate review.164 Shelby County, which was decided through a normal 
petition for certiorari, started with an attempt to get a three-judge court.165 At 
the recent oral argument in the Shapiro v. McManus case, concerning when 
three-judge courts are appropriate in the face of an argument that a plaintiff is 
raising frivolous claims, Chief Justice Roberts again expressed his belief that 
mandatory appellate jurisdiction forces the Court’s hand: 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I mean, the other alternative is it’s a three-judge 
district court, and then we have to take it on the merits. I mean, that’s a serious 
problem because there are a lot of cases that come up in three-judge district courts 
that would be the kind of case—I speak for myself, anyway—that we might deny 
 
163. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18-19, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 
08-205), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08      
-205.pdf. 
164. See infra Appendix; see also Hasen, supra note 18, at 328 n.12 (noting that about half the 
cases from 2001 to 2010 arrived at the Court via mandatory appellate jurisdiction). 
165. See David Gans, The Role of Three-Judge Courts in Conservative Attacks on Campaign 
Finance Reform and Voting Rights, BALKINIZATION (1’June 12, 2015, 10:40 AM), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/06/the-role-of-three-judge-courts-in.html (“When 
Shelby County v. Holder was filed, the plaintiffs requested that it be heard by a three-
judge court. The district judge in the case, however, determined that it should be heard 
by him alone.”). 
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cert in, to let the issue percolate. And now with the three-judge district court, no, 
we have to decide it on the merits.166 
Three cases in the October 2015 Term came to the Court on mandatory 
appellate review.167 Indeed, the Supreme Court refused to consider the one 
person, one vote issue when it arrived at the Court via a petition for certiorari 
in 2001, over the objections of Justice Thomas,168 only to decide to hear the 
same issue fourteen years later in Evenwel.169 It looks like plaintiffs in Evenwel 
pursued the three-judge court as a deliberate strategy.170 
There are limits to the strategizing, however, as case law develops about 
when three-judge courts are appropriate in particular types of cases. Further, 
mandatory appellate jurisdiction does not always lead to conservative results. 
It did in Citizens United, McCutcheon, and (to some extent) in NAMUDNO, but it 
did not in the Arizona or Alabama redistricting cases. 
Appellate jurisdiction does seem to boost the odds of getting the Court to 
hear a case, making it worthwhile in the period before Justice Scalia’s death to 
pursue if one was a conservative litigant. The RNC recently dropped a new 
challenge to some party-related soft money rules after the case was rejected for 
consideration by a three-judge court171 and put instead on track for en banc 
 
166. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450 (2015) (No. 14-
990), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/14-990 
_3f14.pdf.  
167. See Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732 (2016); Harris v. Ariz. Indep. 
Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301 (2016); Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016). 
168. Chen v. City of Houston, 532 U.S. 1046, 1046-47 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). 
169. Adam Liptak, With Subtle Signals, Supreme Court Justices Request the Cases They Want to 
Hear, N.Y. TIMES (1’July 6, 2015), http://www.nyti.ms/1KLaZVG. 
170. As reporter Tony Mauro explained: 
Texas voters Sue Evenwel and Ed Pfenninger were recruited for the lawsuit to claim that 
their state Senate districts were improper because they contain more registered voters than are 
needed in urban districts. As with the affirmative action and voting rights cases, Blum found 
the plaintiffs with a Supreme Court challenge in mind. Blum mounted a similar lawsuit against 
using total population in drawing districts in Lepak v. City of Irving, which the Supreme 
Court declined to review in 2013.  
Aided by lawyers from Wiley Rein, including William Consovoy who last year left to 
create Consovoy McCarthy, Blum tried again. This time, instead of a petition for certiorari, the 
Evenwel case came to the court through a different route—a challenge to a statewide 
redistricting program that is by law reviewed by a three-judge federal district court panel. That 
panel upheld the Texas districts, paving the way for Blum to appeal through a “jurisdictional 
statement” rather than certiorari. 
Tony Mauro, The Man Behind the Newest Supreme Court Voting Case, NAT’L L.J. (May 26, 
2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202727397771/The-Man-Behind-the  
-Newest-Supreme-Court-Voting-Case. 
171. Order at 1, Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, No. 1:14-cv-00853 (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2014), 
http://www.fec.gov/law/litigation/rnc_order_081914.pdf (denying request for a 
three-judge court). See generally Matea Gold, RNC Files Lawsuit Seeking to Raise 
footnote continued on next page 
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D.C. Circuit review,172 to be followed by a possible petition for certiorari.173 
After dismissing the last suit, the Republican Party of Louisiana, with the same 
lawyer (campaign finance opponent Jim Bopp), then filed a new soft money 
challenge, requesting a three-judge court.174 It was granted the three-judge 
court,175 making Court review much more likely.176 
C. Conservative Variance.  
Variation in the views of conservative Justices is the third reason the 
Court in election law cases did not move as sharply to the right as it could have. 
Despite caricatures by some liberals, the conservative Justices are far from 
monolithic. For example, Justice Thomas is an ardent opponent of campaign 
disclosure laws,177 while Justice Scalia was an enthusiastic supporter.178 Chief 
Justice Roberts, perhaps for institutional reasons or a different view of the 
problems with an elected judiciary, broke with his conservative colleagues in 
Williams-Yulee by upholding under strict scrutiny Florida’s ban on personal 
campaign solicitations by judicial candidates.179 Justice Kennedy, who grew up 
in initiative-rich California and who alone among conservatives has expressed 
 
Unlimited Sums, WASH. POST: POST POLITICS (May 23, 2014, 4:30 PM), http://wpo.st 
/hyNH1 (discussing the RNC filing the lawsuit against the FEC).  
172. Certification Order at 1-3, Republican Nat’l Comm., No. 1:14-cv-00853, http://www.fec 
.gov/law/litigation/rnc_dc_cert_order.pdf (making certain factual findings and 
certifying issues to the en banc D.C. Circuit).  
173. However, a year later the RNC, without explanation, voluntarily dismissed the 
lawsuit. Stipulation Dismissing Plaintiffs and Action, Republican Nat’l Comm., No. 1:14-
cv-00853, http://www.fec.gov/law/litigation/rnc_joint_dismissal.pdf. 
174. Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 50-51, Republican Party of 
La. v. FEC, No. 15-cv-01241 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2015), http://electionlawblog.org/wp            
-content/uploads/soft-money-complaint.pdf.  
175. Memorandum Opinion at 4, Republican Party of La., No. 1:15-cv-01241, 
http://www.fec.gov/law/litigation/lagop_dc_opinion.pdf (granting request for a 
three-judge court).  
176. Richard L. Hasen, Opinion, The McCain-Feingold Act May Doom Itself, NAT’L L.J. 
(Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202734808860/OpEd-The     
-McCainFeingold-Act-May-Doom-Itself.  
177. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 480-85 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (dissenting on disclosure issues). 
178. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 385 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“I can imagine no reason why an anonymous leaflet is any more 
honorable, as a general matter, than an anonymous phone call or an anonymous letter. 
It facilitates wrong by eliminating accountability, which is ordinarily the very 
purpose of the anonymity.”); see also Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 228 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“I do not look forward to a society which, thanks to the 
Supreme Court, campaigns anonymously (McIntyre) and even exercises the direct 
democracy of initiative and referendum hidden from public scrutiny and protected 
from the accountability of criticism. This does not resemble the Home of the Brave.”). 
179. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1672 (2015). 
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misgivings about partisan gerrymanders,180 broke with his conservative 
colleagues in the Arizona redistricting case, upholding initiative-driven 
redistricting commissions.181 Justice Kennedy also has his own views on the 
scope of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act182 and the racial gerrymandering 
cause of action,183 sometimes causing him to side with the Court’s liberals. 
To some extent, this variance is explained by the relative moderation of 
Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts compared with Justices Alito, Scalia, 
and Thomas. But as the campaign finance disclosure cases show, there remains 
division even among the Court’s most reliable conservatives. 
The Court’s reticence should not be overstated. The Roberts Court was 
still a very conservative Court in its election law jurisprudence, and it moved 
aggressively in cases such as Citizens United and Shelby County. Citizens United 
has started the country’s campaign finance law down a slow but steady decline, 
and Shelby County has removed a key protection for minority voters, leading to 
a spate of new laws in previously covered jurisdictions that make it harder to 
register and vote.184 But a more nuanced picture shows that, for a variety of 
reasons, the Roberts Court’s election law jurisprudence actually could have 
been far worse—and could still get worse depending upon the speed with 
which cases reach the Court, the appetite of the Justices, and potential changes 
in Supreme Court personnel over the next few years. 
III. Options for Election Reform in the Roberts Court Era 
What space remains for progressive election reform after the Court’s 
sharp right, but not maximalist, turn? To begin with, we are entering a period 
of great uncertainty as to the ideological balance on the Court. With Justice 
Scalia’s death, there is the possibility that the Court will swing to the left, at 
least for a time, if Justice Scalia is replaced by a liberal or moderate Justice. 
 
180. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 316 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
181. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658-59, 
2668 (2015). 
182. League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 433-35 (2006); see 
supra note 73 and accompanying text (describing Justice Kennedy’s cultural 
compactness approach in this case, which supported voting rights plaintiffs in Perry). 
183. Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1262-63 (2015); see Hasen, 
supra note 81, at 359-60, 370-71 (describing Justice Kennedy’s embrace of the racial 
gerrymandering cause of action by liberal plaintiffs in the Alabama case). 
184. Jim Rutenberg, A Dream Undone, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (1’July 29, 2015), http://nyti.ms 
/1JRdm5o [hereinafter Rutenberg, A Dream Undone] (describing new voting 
restrictions in previously covered jurisdictions); Jim Rutenberg, The New Attack on 
Hispanic Voting Rights, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 17, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1O8la4D 
[hereinafter Rutenberg, The New Attack] (focusing on Latino voting rights in Pasadena, 
Texas, a previously covered jurisdiction). 
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During such a period, election law is unlikely to get more conservative, and the 
question will become the extent to which a new liberal Supreme Court 
majority would be willing to overturn or limit Roberts Court precedents such 
as Citizens United and Shelby County. 
But with other potential changes in Court personnel over the next half-
decade, it is by no means certain that a progressive Court majority will be 
enduring. Indeed, depending upon political forces, the Court could see shifting 
ideological majorities over the next decade. 
Unless and until the Court moves its doctrine significantly, the space for 
progressive election reform under current Court doctrine varies by 
substantive area. 
A. Campaign Finance Reform.  
As to campaign finance, the Court has greatly constrained the reforms that 
are possible. As the law currently stands, only campaign disclosure laws appear 
immune from eventual successful attack. Campaign contribution limits are 
under increasing pressure thanks to Citizens United and McCutcheon, with the 
logic of those decisions endangering the corporate contribution ban, the soft 
money ban, and even limits on contributions to candidates. While the Court 
has been thus far unwilling to doctrinally pull the trigger to kill what remains 
of campaign finance limits, the tremendous growth of Super PACs and other 
groups has put campaign finance into a kind of death spiral. The rise of Super 
PACs has led some to call for lifting limits on parties and campaigns on the 
theory that these groups are more responsible and funding them will decrease 
polarization.185 During oral argument in the McCutcheon case, for example, 
Justice Scalia relied on the fact that we are not “stopping people from spending 
big money on politics”186 to argue for further deregulation. It is an increasingly 
common refrain. 
Even if the Court did not strike any additional campaign limits, there is 
little that can be done under current doctrine beyond trying to maintain the 
status quo. To be sure, the federal government and reformers should defend 
existing laws, including disclosure laws. Reformers scored a rare victory when 
the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit sitting en banc recently 
upheld unanimously the ban on direct campaign contractor contributions to 
 
185. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the 
Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804, 839 (2014) (“[I]n a world in which 
individuals can contribute unlimited amounts to issue-advocacy Super PACs, 
including Super PACs dedicated to one specific candidate or issue, are we better off 
sharply limiting contributions to parties or their ability to engage in coordinated 
spending with candidates?” (citation omitted)). 
186. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (No. 12-
536), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-536 
_2k81.pdf.  
Election Law’s Path in the Roberts Court’s First Decade 
68 STAN. L. REV. 1597 (2016) 
1626 
candidates.187 So far the ban on corporate contributions to candidates has also 
held.188 
Beyond the status quo, public financing, especially through vouchers, 
deserves reformers’ efforts—although the Court’s decision in the Arizona 
public financing case has called into question any plan aimed at leveling the 
playing field.189 But new and meaningful limits, on contributions to Super 
PACs for example, seem unlikely to survive judicial review under current 
doctrine given cases such as Citizens United and SpeechNow. 
Reform plans, such as multiple-match public financing plans, are second-
best solutions given that the Court has blocked serious limits on spending and 
contributions by the wealthiest actors. The problem is not that reformers have 
a “romanticized” vision of democracy that ignores the role political parties 
must play in making democracy work.190 It is that the structural impediments 
erected by the Court have hobbled what could otherwise be effective reform 
efforts. It likely will take a progressive Supreme Court reversing Citizens 
 
187. Wagner v. FEC, 793 F.3d 1, 3, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (en banc).  
188. See supra Part I.A. 
189. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2824-25 
(2011) (confirming the rejection of the equalization rationale as a constitutionally 
permissible basis for campaign finance regulation); HASEN, supra note 2, at 186 
(discussing how Bennett, the Arizona public financing case, could undermine multiple-
match public financing plans). 
190. For “realist” critiques of reformers along these lines, see BRUCE E. CAIN, DEMOCRACY 
MORE OR LESS: AMERICA’S POLITICAL REFORM QUANDRY 6 (2015); JONATHAN RAUCH, 
POLITICAL REALISM: HOW HACKS, MACHINES, BIG MONEY, AND BACK-ROOM DEALS CAN 
STRENGTHEN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 30 (2015), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media 
/Research/Files/Reports/2015/04/political-realism-rauch/political-realism-rauch 
.pdf?la=en; Pildes, supra note 185, at 850-51; and Ray LaRaja & Brian Schaffner, Want to 
Reduce Polarization? Give Parties More Money, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (1’July 21, 
2014), http://wpo.st/RzNH1. For responses, see THOMAS E. MANN & E.J. DIONNE, JR., 
THE FUTILITY OF NOSTALGIA AND THE ROMANTICISM OF THE NEW POLITICAL REALISTS 1-
2 (2015), http://brook.gs/1GcuFf8; Mark Schmitt, Democratic Romanticism and Its 
Critics, 36 DEMOCRACY J. (2015), http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/36 
/democratic-romanticism-and-its-critics; Lee Drutman, Can Unlimited Contributions to 
Political Parties Really Reduce Polarization?, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (1’June 23, 2015), 
http://wpo.st/H-OH1; and Richard L. Hasen, Democracy for Grownups1’: Review of 
Democracy More or Less: America’s Political Reform Quandary, by Bruce E. Cain, NEW 
RAMBLER REV. (Nov. 9, 2015), http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law 
/democracy-for-grownups. Richard Pildes in particular makes the argument that 
campaign finance vouchers may exacerbate polarization. Pildes, supra note 185, at 827 
(“Democratizing campaign contributions through vouchers might well, ironically, fuel 
the flames of political polarization, as compared to public financing systems funded in 
the more traditional way, through general revenues.”). In HASEN, supra note 2, at 156-
59, I suggest that widely used campaign finance vouchers could actually decrease 
polarization, by bringing many more voters into the process of distributing campaign 
money. I acknowledge, however, the risk of vouchers to political parties and recognize 
it might be necessary to have a portion of vouchers distributed directly to political 
parties for this reason. 
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United and Buckley to provide the opportunity to enact comprehensive 
campaign reform and then to see the effects of more than a half-hearted reform 
upon governance.191 
B. Voting Rights Act Reform.  
The space for improving the Voting Rights Act is not quite as cramped as 
for campaign finance reform, but options are still limited. The Court in Shelby 
County quashed section 5 (by striking the coverage formula of section 4) at a 
time when Republicans in Congress have moved away from their past support 
for preclearance.192 The Voting Rights Amendment Act (VRAA) designed to 
partially restore preclearance, although co-sponsored by former House 
Judiciary Chair James Sensenbrenner (who shepherded through the 2006 VRA 
renewal), never even got a hearing in the Republican-led House and has very 
few Republican co-sponsors.193 
The stalemate over a new coverage formula creates a political problem, 
but it obscures a more fundamental legal one. It is not clear that any new 
approaches to preclearance, such as the VRAA’s proposal to use violations of 
section 2 to trigger new preclearance obligations,194 would pass constitutional 
muster in the Supreme Court under current doctrine. To the extent Shelby 
County requires evidence of current constitutional violations, and many section 
2 violations do not require proof of unconstitutionality, the current Roberts 
Court could well reject the revised preclearance formula as exceeding 
congressional power or a violation of the “equal sovereignty” principle which 
says that the federal government must, at least sometimes, treat states 
equally.195 
As for the currently-drafted section 2, we may have reached the limits of 
its potential for reform. Section 2 redistricting claims appear to have been 
brought in most larger jurisdictions where there was good potential for courts 
 
191. I make this case in HASEN, supra note 2, at 176-89. 
192. Stephanie Condon, Does America Need to Restore the Voting Rights Act?, CBS NEWS 
(Aug. 5, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/does-america-need-to-restore 
-the-voting-rights-act (tracing the history of Republican views on preclearance 
renewal). 
193. See Kate Nocera, Judiciary Chairman in No Rush to Move on Voting Rights Act Bill, 
BUZZFEED (1’June 26, 2014, 1:33 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/katenocera/judiciary    
-chairman-in-no-rush-to-move-on-voting-rights-act-r; Sue Sturgis, Honoring Voting 
Rights Heroes, Blocking Voting Rights Restoration, INST. FOR SOUTHERN STUD. (Feb. 25, 
2016, 1:45 PM), http://www.southernstudies.org/2016/02/honoring-voting-rights        
-heroes-blocking-voting-righ.html (“Of the 13 Republican co-sponsors of the Voting 
Rights Amendment Act, only two represent Southern states . . . .”). 
194. Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014, H.R. 3899, 113th Cong. § 3 (2014), 
https://www .congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3899. 
195. See Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 MICH L. REV. 1207, 1210-13 (2016) 
(critiquing equal sovereignty concept). 
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to order the creation of additional minority opportunity districts (although 
new issues arise after each round of redistricting in jurisdictions with such 
districts). The Department of Justice, even under a Democratic administration, 
has brought very few section 2 suits in recent years.196 The Court’s refusal in 
Bartlett to recognize crossover district claims and LULAC1’s rejection of 
influence-district claims prevented further expansion of section 2’s reach in 
redistricting cases, and the redefinition of cultural compactness in LULAC may 
endanger some existing section 2 districts.197 
Section 2 vote denial claims, such as claims against the legality of onerous 
voter identification laws, face a different problem. A conservative Supreme 
Court would be likely to shut down this path given the high bar to prove a 
section 2 violation.198 If courts limit section 2’s application to vote denial 
claims, as the Seventh Circuit recently did in the Wisconsin case,199 
congressional Republicans are unlikely to support an amendment to 
strengthen section 2. Even if Congress amended section 2 to make vote denial 
claims easier to bring, a conservative Supreme Court could very well strike 
down such an amendment as an unconstitutional exercise of congressional 
power under Shelby County absent proof of actual constitutional violations by 
the states. 
Thus, while the Voting Rights Act has accomplished much, we now have a 
weakened set of Voting Rights Act protections for minority voters, 
protections that do not appear in immediate danger of being completely killed 
by the Supreme Court but without immediate political or legal prospects for 
strengthening, barring a shift in the ideological balance on the Court. 
C. Partisan Gerrymandering Reform.  
Things are brighter from a reform perspective on the use of direct 
democracy to police partisan gerrymandering and other legislative conflicts of 
interest. The Court’s recent Arizona200 decision has removed a cloud from 
 
196. Since 2008, the Department of Justice under the Obama Administration has filed only 
four section 2 suits (and intervened in one section 2 suit) involving redistricting. For a 
list, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Cases Raising Claims Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/litigation/recent_sec2.php (last updated 
Oct. 7, 2015). 
197. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 13-18 (2009); League of United Latin Am. Citizens 
(LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 433-34 (2006). On LULAC reducing the number of 
section 2 districts, see Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The South After Shelby County, 
2013 SUP. CT. REV. 55, 79 n.80, 96, 103. 
198. For a look at how courts have thus far evaluated such claims, see Tokaji, supra note 92, 
at 448, 463-64, 467. 
199. Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 745, 751, 753 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied by an equally 
divided court, 773 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015). 
200. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). 
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efforts to use initiatives to push electoral commissions, fair districting 
amendments, political primary reform, and other experimentation applied to 
congressional elections. These experiments may not always be wise; top-two 
primaries, for example, may not be providing the ideological moderation that 
its supporters predicted.201 Independent commissions might be more apt than 
legislators to draw competitive districts, but competitiveness may mean that 
more voters within each district are dissatisfied with their legislative 
representation.202 The Court’s Arizona and Washington State Grange203 cases 
properly put the question of some reforms into the hands of voters rather than 
the courts. 
D. Election Administration Reform.  
The biggest arena in which the Court’s rulings have opened room for 
political action is election administration. The Court’s Shelby County204 decision 
ended federal oversight of election administration changes in covered 
jurisdictions. The Court’s Crawford205 decision gave the green light for states to 
enact strict voter identification laws, even along party lines, apparently free of 
federal constitutional claims. With this space widely opened, many Republican 
legislatures have seized the opportunity to tighten up registration and voting 
rules.206 
The battle over election rules continues to play out partially in court, with 
cases being filed in both state and federal courts. In the 2013-2014 election 
season, the high rate of election litigation the country has witnessed since Bush 
v. Gore increased slightly.207 With 266 cases in 2013 and 302 cases in 2014, the 
 
201. Volume 7, Issue 1 of the California Journal of Politics and Policy contains articles 
debating the merits of and analyzing data on California’s switch to a top-two primary. 
The issue is posted at http://escholarship.org/uc/search?entity=cjpp;volume=7;issue 
=1. See also David Siders, New Research Offers Four Lessons from California’s Top-Two 
Primary, SACRAMENTO BEE (Feb. 7, 2015, 4:01 PM), http://sacb.ee/2tna (describing 
research findings). 
202. Persily, supra note 109, at 680 (describing inevitable tradeoffs in redistricting goals).  
203. See generally Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. at 2671 (approving power of 
voters to adopt redistricting reform via voter initiative); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. 
State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008) (upholding voter-approved measure 
establishing a top-two primary). 
204. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). 
205. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 185-89 (2008). 
206. See Rutenberg, A Dream Undone, supra note 184 (describing fights over post-Shelby 
County voting restrictions); Rutenberg, The New Attack, supra note 184 (same). 
207. For the data through 2010 and the methodology used to compute these figures, see 
Hasen, supra note 18, at 327 & n.9, 329 fig.3. For 2011-2012, see Hasen, supra note 91, at 
1870-71 & nn. 41-43. I have posted the 2013-2014 data at Richard L. Hasen, Election 
Challenge 2013-14 (n.d.), http://electionlawblog.org/wp-content/uploads/election        
footnote continued on next page 
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E. Expectations for the Future.  
Over the next few years, with the Supreme Court’s composition uncertain, 
it is unclear how federal challenges to election administration rollbacks by 
Republican legislatures under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the 
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause will fare. It is even harder to predict 
how things will go with state law challenges, given each state’s own 
 
-challenge-2013-14.xlsx. I have calculated the data used in Figure 1 from these datasets. 
See id.  
208. Hasen, supra note 91, at 1871. 
209. See Hasen, supra note 207. 
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constitutional voting protections and the politics and precedents of each state’s 
supreme court.210 
Where litigation fails, election administration battles will shift 
increasingly from the legal arena to the political arena. Polarization and 
decentralization of election administration questions have already led to the 
emergence of “red state election law” and “blue state election law,” with voting 
restrictions increasingly enacted in many Republican-leaning states but not 
Democratic-leaning states or states with mixed control.211 In places such as 
North Carolina, “Moral Monday” protests have focused upon election law 
rollbacks and other changes.212 We should expect to see social protests and 
agitation elsewhere, with election administration rules shifting as partisan 
control of state governments shifts. In states with shifting electoral majorities, 
election law will likely shift as well, although the election law changes 
themselves have the potential to affect which party holds state legislatures and 
governorships. 
Conclusion 
My argument is not that things were not as bad as they appeared at the 
Roberts Court. Citizens United and Shelby County in particular are significant, 
detrimental decisions that have already shaped and will continue to shape our 
national politics. I have focused this Essay on why the Court with five 
conservative Justices did not go even further in a conservative direction and 
what reformers can do in light of the Court’s rulings. In many arenas, 
meaningful reform options will have to await a change in the balance of power 
on the Court or in Congress. In other arenas, the fights will be in both the state 
courtroom and in state capitols, where the partisanship of election disputes 
often is more direct and predictable than at the U.S. Supreme Court. Perhaps 
the most interesting question about the Court ten years from now will be 
whether a new liberal Supreme Court has moved as far as it could have away 
from the positions taken during the first ten years of the Roberts Court.  
 
210. See generally Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. 89 (2014) (describing the right to vote under state constitutions); Joshua A. 
Douglas, State Judges and the Right to Vote, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (forthcoming 2016) 
(describing the role of state judges in protecting voting rights), http://papers 
.ssrn.com/abstract_id=2495078. 
211. Hasen, supra note 7.  
212. Ari Berman, The 2015 Moral Monday Movement1’: ‘North Carolina is Our Selma,’ NATION 
(Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/2015-moral-monday-movement      
-north-carolina-our-selma.  
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2. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006)* 
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5. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) 
6. Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437 (2007)* 
7. FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007)* 
8. New York State Board of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008) 
9. Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008) 
10. Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008) 
11. Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406 (2008)* 
12. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008)* 
13. Brunner v. Ohio Republican Party, 555 U.S. 5 (2008) 
14. Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association, 555 U.S. 353 (2009) 
15. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009) 
16. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) 
17. Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009)* 
18. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)* 
19. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010) 
20. Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) 
21. Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343 (2011) 
22. Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012)* 
23. Tennant v. Jefferson County, 133 S. Ct. 3 (2012)* 
24. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) 
25. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014)* 
26. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014) 
27. Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015)* 
28. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015) 
29. Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,  
135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015)* 
30. Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450 (2015) 
 
 † This case was decided after Chief Justice Roberts joined the Supreme Court but before 
Justice Alito joined. 
